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Abstract- The electronic mail plays an unavoidable role in the 
humankind communications. With the great interest for the 
connection via mobile platforms, and the growing number of 
vulnerabilities and attacks, it is essential to provide suitable 
security solutions regarding the limitations of resource restricted 
platforms. Although some solutions such as PGP and S/MIME 
are currently available for the secure e-mail over the Internet, 
they are based on traditional public key cryptography that 
involves huge computational costs. In this paper, a new secure 
application-layer protocol, called SMEmail, is introduced that 
provides several security attributes such as confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and forward secrecy 
of message confidentiality for the electronic mails. SMEmail 
offers an elliptic curve-based public key solution that uses public 
keys for the secure key establishment of a symmetric encryption, 
and is so suitable for the resource restricted platforms such as 
mobile phones. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, the electronic mail (e-mail) plays an unavoidable 
role in the humankind communications. With the increasingly 
growing reliance on electronic mail in one hand, and the 
growing number of vulnerabilities and attacks on the other 
hand, there is an increasingly demand for the security 
solutions. Despite of the critical role of e-mail in the typical 
Internet user’s life, e-mail as will be described later is not so 
secure.  
The number of mobile subscribers has exceeded 3.33 billion 
people in the world [1] that is so greater than that of the 
Internet users. Mobile phones especially in the upper 
generations of cellular systems can connect to Internet, and the 
subscribers are then capable of sending and receiving e-mails. 
The processing capabilities of mobile phones are increasingly 
enhanced but it cannot compete with the processing 
capabilities of personal computers. There are also some 
additional security problems in the wireless media that are not 
the case in a wired system. Therefore, special secure protocols 
are required for the mobile platforms. 
Two major solutions are available now that provide the end-
to-end security for the e-mail: Secure/Multipurpose Internet 
Mail Extension (S/MIME) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), 
both of them are using the traditional public key cryptography 
[2] that involves huge computational costs and is not so 
suitable for the mobile devices that are dealing with 
processing and power limitations.  
In this paper, a new protocol for the secure e-mail, called 
SMEmail, is introduced that provides several security 
attributes such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
non-repudiation, and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality. Since it deploys elliptic curves and the concept 
of signcryption, it decreases the computational costs and 
communication overheads, and it is so suitable for the mobile 
devices. This paper is organized as follows. The security of e-
mail is briefly evaluated in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to 
description of our proposed protocol (SMEmail), Section 4 
takes a glimpse at its security attributes, and Section 5 
provides the conclusions. 
II. THE SECURITY OF E-MAIL 
Data Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-
repudiation, Access control, and Availability are the most 
important security services in the security criteria that should 
be taken into account in secure applications and systems [2]. 
However, there is no provision for such security services in 
the traditional e-mail protocols. E-mail is vulnerable to both 
passive and active attacks. Passive threats include Release of 
message contents, and Traffic analysis while active threats 
include Modification of message contents, Masquerade, 
Replay, and Denial of Service (DoS) [2]. Actually, all the 
mentioned threats are applicable to the traditional e-mail 
protocols [3, 4]:  
 Disclosure of Information: Most of e-mails are currently 
transmitted in the clear (not encrypted). By means of some 
available tools, persons other than the designated recipients 
can read the e-mail contents.  
 Traffic analysis: It is believed that some countries are 
routinely monitoring e-mail messages as part of their 
Echelon project. This is not just for counter-terrorism 
reasons but also to facilitate combat against industrial 
espionage and to carry out political eavesdropping [4]. 
However, it is not devoted to the national agencies since 
there is a thriving business in providing commercial and 
criminal elements with the information within e-mails. 
 Modification of messages: E-mail contents can be modified 
during transport or storage. Here, the man-in-the-middle 
attack does not necessarily require the control of gateway 
since an attacker that resides on the same Local Area 
Network (LAN), can use an Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) spoofing tool such as “ettercap” to intercept or 
modify all the e-mail packets going to and from the mail 
server or gateway.  
 Masquerade: It is possible to send a message in the name of 
another person or organization. 
 Replay of previous messages: Previous messages may be 
resent to other recipients. This may lead to loss, confusion, 
or damage to the reputation of an individual or organization. 
It can cause some damage if e-mail is used for certain 
applications such as funds transferring, registration, and 
reservation. 
 Spoofing: False messages may be inserted into mail system 
of another user. It can be accomplished from within a LAN, 
or from an external environment using Trojan horses. 
 Denial of Service: It can put a mail system out of order by 
overloading it with mail shots. It can be carried out using 
Trojan horses or viruses sent to users within the contents of 
e-mails. It is also possible to block the user accounts by 
repeatedly entering wrong passwords in the login. 
S/MIME and PGP as two major solutions that were 
developed for making the electronic mails secure, use public 
key cryptography for providing the same security services at 
the application layer. The main difference is that the former 
was intended as an industry standard for commercial and 
organization use while the latter is a choice for personal e-mail 
security. PGP tried to be independent of any governmental or 
standards organization. PGP uses a trust model instead of 
using the conventional digital certificates while S/MIME uses 
the well-tried X.509v3 certificates. S/MIME is a security 
enhancement to the MIME Internet e-mail format standard 
that secures a MIME entity with signature, encryption, or both 
of them [5]. Both PGP and S/MIME are supposed to be run on 
personal computers that take advantages of adequate 
processing capabilities. Their recommended approaches are 
exponentiation-based, and they follow the so-called 
“signature-then-encryption” scheme.  
Currently, the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has 
revolutionized the arena of security establishment. The EC-
based solutions are usually based on difficulty of solving the 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and 
factorization in elliptic curves [6]. The EC-based systems can 
attain to a desired security level with significantly smaller 
keys than those of required by their exponential-based 
counterparts. As an example, it is believed that a 160-bit key 
in an EC-based system provides the same level of security as 
that of a 1024-bit key in a RSA-based system [7]. This creates 
great efficiencies in key storage, certificate size, memory 
usage, and required processing so it enhances the speed and 
leads to efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage that are 
basic limitations of resource constrained devices. The EC-
based approaches can have a computationally advantage over 
their exponential-based counterparts, especially for the 
resource restricted platforms. As a practical example, the 
Infineon's SLE 66CUX640P security controller that has 
usages in USB applications, executes an elliptic curve point 
multiplication (with a 160-bits modulus) in an average time of 
83ms while it carries out a modular exponentiation (with a 
1024-bits modulus) in an average time of 220ms, both at the 
clock frequency of 15MHz [7].  
In the traditional signature-then-encryption schemes, the 
plaintext is digitally signed, and then the plaintext plus 
signature are encrypted. Such summation has two problems: 
Low efficiency and high costs of such summation, and the 
case that any arbitrary scheme cannot guarantee the security or 
may not provide certain security attributes such as forward 
secrecy. Recently, the signcryption is proposed as a suitable 
alternative for the traditional signature-then-encryption 
schemes. The signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic 
technique that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities of 
digital signature and encryption in a single logical step, and 
can effectively decrease the computational costs and 
communication overheads in comparison with the traditional 
signature-then-encryption schemes. As a typical example, an 
EC-based signcryption scheme can save 58% of computational 
costs and 40% of communication overheads when it is 
compared with the traditional EC-based signature-then-
encryption schemes [8]. Several signcryption schemes are 
proposed over the years, each of them offering different level 
of security services and computational costs. Our proposed 
protocol (SMEmail) that will be described in the next section 
uses a variant of a signcryption scheme that was initially 
developed in [9]. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME (SMEMAIL) 
A brief description of our proposed protocol (SMEmail) is 
provided in this section. SMEmail is an application-layer 
protocol that provides an end-to-end security for electronic 
mails in mobile environments. The end-to-end security in the 
cellular systems can be generally provided by exploiting the 
processing capabilities of one or some of the following items 
[10]: 
1) The Mobile Equipment (ME) using programming 
languages, 
2) The SIM card using SIM Application Toolkit (SAT), 
3) An additional smart card, e.g. JavaCard, 
4) A crypto-processor that is embedded in the ME, 
5) A portable PC connected to the ME. 
 SMEmail is based on the first solution, and suggests using 
J2ME (Java 2 Mobile Edition) as a programming platform that 
is designed for resource restricted devices such as mobile 
phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), and is 
supported by most of currently available mobile phones. 
Consequently, SMEmail is implemented as a MIDlet that will 
be installed on the mobile phones of subscribers. 
SMEmail is designed and adapted for the certain restrictions 
and specifications of mobile phones. It consists of 
initialization phase that is accomplished once at the 
initialization of the system, and message exchange phase in 
which the participants exchange their secured e-mail contents. 
Since SMEmail deploys Public Key Cryptography (PKC), 
there is a revocation phase that follows the typical rules of 
Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) but it is not considered in 
this paper. 
A. Initialization 
The initialization phase of SMEmail includes: 
1) Selecting the domain parameters. 
2) Installing the software application on ME. 
3) Generating the public/private keys, and issuing a certificate 
for the public key of each user. 
The domain parameters consist of a suitably selected elliptic 
curve E defined over the finite field qF with the Weierstrass 
equation of the form baxxy  32 , and a base point 
)( qFEG  in which q is a large prime number. In order to 
make the elliptic curve non-singular, qFba ,  should satisfy 
)(mod0274 23 qba  . To guard against small subgroup 
attacks [6], the point G should be of prime order n 
( OnG  where O denotes the point of elliptic curve at 
infinity), and we should have qn 4 . To protect against 
other known attacks on special classes of elliptic curves, n 
should not divide 1iq  for all fi 1 ( 20f  suffices in 
practice), qn  should be satisfied, and the curve should be 
non-supersingular [6]. To guarantee the intractability of 
ECDLP to Pollard-rho and Pohlig-Hellman algorithms [11], n 
should also satisfy 1602n . NIST SP 800-56A [12] has also 
specified the minimum bit lengths of elliptic curve's domain 
parameters for different required level of security. 
As SMEmail uses a block cipher in its core for encrypting 
the e-mail contents, it is recommended to select a strong and 
efficient block cipher such as AES as a predefined algorithm 
for the symmetric encryption. However, it is also feasible to 
provide a list of block ciphers and let the user choose the 
suitable algorithm, as it is accomplished in PGP, but this is not 
recommended for a resource restricted device since it can 
increase the code size of application.  
The private key of user U is a randomly selected integer 
]1,1[  nSK RU , and the corresponding public key is 
generated as GSKPK UU  . The process of public/private key 
generation in SMEmail is depicted in Fig. 1. The CA server 
issues a certificate UCert  for the public key of each user. The 
certificates contain strings of information that uniquely 
identify users and bind their identities to their public keys. The 
X.509v3 certificates are a popular type of certificates that are 
extensively used, and they are also used for the SMEmail. 
Since e-mail addresses are unique in the world, they will be 
regarded as the unique identifier of each user (IDU). The 
unique identifier, the public key, and the corresponding 
certificate of each user are also stored in an LDAP 
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) directory, as it is 
depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Public/private key generation in SMEmail 
 
 Since public/private keys are to be generated at end-entities, 
several precautions should be taken into account to thwart the 
potential threats. The CA should verify that each entity really 
possesses the corresponding private key of its claimed public 
key. This may be accomplished by a zero-knowledge 
technique. To thwart the invalid-curve attacks, the CA server 
should also check the validity of public keys. The public key 
of user U, ),( yxPKU   is valid if all the following conditions 
are simultaneously satisfied [13]: 
(a) OUU  . 
(b) x and y should have the proper format of qF elements. 
(c) UPK  should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
It is assumed that the participants have access to an 
authentic copy of the CA's public key, in order to use it for the 
certificate validation. According to GSM 11.11 standard, the 
trusted keys and certificates (e.g. CA's) are stored in 4FXX 
files. The key information can be stored in file 4F50. The 
private key can be encrypted using a user's password or PIN 
(Personal Identification Number) and be stored in an 
elementary file of the SIM. The public keys can be stored in a 
transparent elementary file. The hash value of private key that 
may be used for validation of the encrypting password can 
also be stored in the SIM.  
The application of SMEmail can be manually installed on 
the mobile phone if the mobile phone is capable of supporting 
such an application. It is also feasible to download and install 
the application via an Over-The-Air (OTA) server, as it is 
depicted in Fig. 2, where the Application Management 
Software (AMS) takes care of downloading and installing 
application on the device. A complete view of key generation 
and application installation using the OTA server is depicted 
in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The key generation and application installation in SMEmail when 
the application installation is accomplished via an OTA server 
 
B. Message Exchange 
 SMEmail is a certificate-based protocol so it is necessary 
for both of participants to perform the certificate validation for 
the certificate of the other party and use it for verifying the 
corresponding public key. The process of certificate validation 
includes [11]: 
(a) Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the certificate 
by verifying the CA's signature on the certificate. 
(b) Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
(c) Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
 The revocation status can be examined using either of 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Delta CRL, or Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [11]. Since CRL is too 
large for the limited memory capacity of mobile devices, 
SMEmail uses OCSP [14] for checking the revocation status 
of the certificates. It has another advantage due to the online 
and timely inquiry feature of the OCSP. However, the OCSP 
server's duties in the SMEmail differ from what is specified in 
RFC 2560. The OCSP server in the SMEmail should also 
verify the public key of the corresponding user using his/her 
certificate, if the queried certificate has a “good” status. The 
result of such verification should be included in the OCSP 
response. The OCSP responses are digitally signed with a 
private key that its corresponding trusted public key is known 
to the participants. Basic configuration of the SMEmail 
protocol is depicted in Fig. 3 in which OCSPA and OCSPB are 
the OCSP tokens for the certificates of Alice and Bob where 
Alice is the sender or initiator of the protocol and Bob is the 
designated recipient. The message exchange for basic 
configuration of the SMEmail is as follows.  
 
 
Figure 3. Basic configuration of the SMEmail 
 
SMEmail Composing: The SMEmail application on the Alice 
side queries the OCSP server via the Bob's identifier (IDB) for 
his public key and the revocation status of his certificate. The 
OCSP server produces an OCSP response, digitally signs it, 
and sends (IDB, PKB, OCSPB) to Alice. The SMEmail 
application on the Alice side verifies the OCSP server's 
signature, and uses IDB and PKB to generate ),,( sCR  from the 
Alice's message M by following the below steps: 
(1) Randomly selects an integer ]1,1[  nr R . 
(2) Computes ),( RR yxrGR  . 
(3) Computes ),()~( KKBAR yxPKSKxrK   where 
    )2mod(2~ 2/2/ fRfR xx   in which   1log2  nf . 
If OK   it goes back to step (1). Otherwise, it drives the 
secret key of encryption as )||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk   
in which H' is a one-way hash function that generates the 
required number of bits for the secret key of deployed 
symmetric encryption algorithm. 
(4) Computes the ciphertext as )(MEC k  where E(.) 
denotes the approved block cipher. 
(5) Computes the digital signature as )(modnrtSKs A   
where )||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR . 
(6) Composes a MIME entity containing ),,( sCR  as the 
message where the e-mail address of Bob is noted as the 
recipient, and forwards it to the mail server. 
 
SMEmail Delivering: The SMEmail application on the Bob 
side queries the OCSP server via the Alice's identifier (IDA) 
for her public key and revocation status of her certificate. The 
OCSP server produces an OCSP response, digitally signs it, 
and sends (IDA, PKA, OCSPA) to Bob. The SMEmail 
application on the Bob side verifies the OCSP server's 
signature and follows the below steps to extract the message 
of Alice and verify her signature: 
(1) Computes ),()~( KKARB yxPKxRSKK   and derives 
the secret key of encryption as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk  . 
(2) Decrypts the ciphertext as )(CDM k . 
(3) Computes )||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR . 
(4) Verifies whether AtPKRsG
? . If it is true, the extracted 
plaintext M is accepted as the true message of Alice. 
Otherwise, it will be rejected. 
 
The above-mentioned steps are regarded to the basic 
configuration of the SMEmail protocol that its basic 
configuration is depicted in Fig. 3. However, it is possible to 
enhance the performance by delegating the required 
validations to a trusted server. The required time of sending a 
certificate to a validation server, receiving, and authenticating 
the response can be considerably less than the required time of 
performing the certificate path discovery and validation on the 
resource constrained platforms such as mobile phones. The 
performance of SMEmail will be greatly enhanced by 
delegating the validations to a Delegated Validation (DV) 
server, as it is depicted in Fig. 4 and 5. The DV server 
accomplishes the certificate validation via the Delegated Path 
Validation (DPV) protocol [15]. However, its duties defer 
from what is specified in RFC 3379. The DV server 
accomplishes the certificate and public key validations for 
both Alice and Bob. It queries the database server for the 
certificates of the participants via their identifiers. It obtains 
the revocation statuses by getting OCSP responses from the 
OCSP server.  
 
 
Figure 4. Delegated configuration of SMEmail using a typical Mail Server 
(the Mail Server is independent of the wireless network) 
 
 
Figure 5. Delegated configuration of SMEmail when the Mail Server is 
adapted for the resource constraints (the Mail Server is provided by the 
wireless network or it is adapted for the mobile communications) 
 
In the delegated configuration of SMEmail, all the secured 
e-mails are directed to the DV server. The DV server will 
contact the designated recipient after a successful validation. If 
any error occurs, the DV server sends an error message to the 
initiator and saves a copy in its log file. The DV server 
digitally signs its responses unless an error is occurred. The 
signed responses DVVER  should include a hash value of all the 
transmitted parameters in addition to identifiers of both Alice 
and Bob. Here, Bob just checks the signature of DV server. 
Alice does not need to get any OCSP response for the 
certificate of Bob. She just needs to know the public key of 
Bob and save it in his phone for the future uses. If she does not 
know the public key of Bob, she can query it from the 
database server, as it is depicted in Fig. 4 and 5. Therefore, in 
the delegated configuration of SMEmail, the computational 
costs and communication overheads are efficiently decreased 
for the end-entities. 
IV. THE SECURITY OF SMEMAIL 
 The correctness of SMEmail can be simply verified. Alice 
and Bob reach to the same secret key of symmetric encryption 
as:  
 
 GSKSKxrPKSKxrK BARBARA )~()~(  
   BARBARB KPKxRSKGSKxrGSK  )~()~(  
 
 The session key derivation function of SMEmail is an 
improved variant of the HMQV key establishment protocol 
[16]. However, it does not exactly correspond with the HMQV 
specifications. Defining Rx~  as the least significant half in 
binary representation of Rx  is just a trade-off between 
security and efficiency. Hereunder, some security attributes of 
the SMEmail are briefly described. 
 
1) Confidentiality: The confidentiality is completely resided in 
the secrecy of session key since SMEmail uses a strong block 
cipher. The session key differs for different sessions and is 
derived from the private keys of the participants. The 
Unknown Key-Share (UKS) attack [17] is thwarted because 
the identifier of Alice is involved in derivation of the session 
key k. There are only two ways to defeat the confidentiality: 
finding BSK , or having both ASK  and r. Deriving the private 
keys and finding the corresponding r of a specific R are in 
deposit of solving the ECDLP that is computationally 
infeasible with the selected domain parameters of SMEmail. 
 
2) Authentication: The implicit authentication is provided by 
SMEmail in three ways: SMEmail is a certificate-based 
protocol in which both of participants verify the certificate of 
the other party. An implicit authentication is also involved in 
the session key establishment so only the correct party who 
has the true private key can reach to the correct key agreement 
and perform the unsigncryption. Finally, the recipient verifies 
the signature by checking the AtPKRsG   condition. 
 
3) Unforgeability: It is computationally infeasible to forge a 
valid ),,( sRM  with ),,( sRM  . A valid forged signature s' 
should satisfy ASKttss )(   so the knowledge of t, t' and 
ASK  is necessary. To find the true values of t and t', the 
attacker should know the session key k that its knowledge is in 
deposit of his knowledge of BSK , or both ASK  and r. 
Otherwise, he cannot correctly forge the signature and his 
forged signature will be recognized in the delivering phase of 
SMEmail, when checking the AtPKRsG   condition. 
 
4) Non-repudiation: The non-repudiation can be deduced from 
the unforgeability. It is computationally infeasible to forge the 
signature of Alice without having her private key. 
 
5) Integrity: The hash value of plaintext concatenated with 
some variable parameters is involved in the signature 
generation so any alteration in the plaintext will change the 
signature. The integrity is guarantied by the security attributes 
of the deployed hash function and also unforgeability of the 
signature. The attacker should also have a valid session key to 
encrypt his modified message. Otherwise, his modified 
message will not be correctly decrypted by Bob. The session 
key is also involved in signature generation so he should have 
BSK  or equivalently, both ASK  and r to establish a valid 
session key. He should also find a collision for the deployed 
hash function that is computationally infeasible. Otherwise, he 
cannot forge a valid signature. The integrity is implicitly 
verified when Bob checks the AtPKRsG   condition. 
 
6) Forward secrecy of message confidentiality: This means 
that even if the private key of Alice is revealed, the adversary 
is not capable of decrypting the previously signcrypted 
contents. As it was noted, the only way to defeat the message 
confidentiality is to have BSK , or both of ASK  and r. When 
ASK  is revealed, for decryption to be possible, it is necessary 
to have the value of random number r for the corresponding 
session that is in deposit of solving the ECDLP which is 
computationally infeasible with the selected domain 
parameters. As a one-pass protocol, we cannot prospect 
SMEmail for the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) since there is 
not any session-specific input from Bob. However, it provides 
the partial forward secrecy under intractability of the ECDLP. 
 
7) Public verifiability: Given ),,,,( skMCR , anybody can 
compute )||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR  and verify the 
signature of Alice by checking the AtPKRsG   condition 
and without any need for the private keys of the participants. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A new public key-based protocol for the secure e-mail in 
mobile environments (SMEmail) is introduced in this paper. It 
is an application-layer protocol that simultaneously provides 
the security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation, and forward secrecy of 
message confidentiality for the electronic mails. It effectively 
combines encryption and digital signature, and uses public 
keys for a secure key establishment where the established 
session key is used for enciphering contents via a symmetric 
encryption. SMEmail has great computational advantages over 
the traditional public key solutions, and is so suitable for 
mobile environments that are dealing with the resource 
constraints since it deploys elliptic curves and the concept of 
signcryption, and encrypts data using a symmetric enciphering 
algorithm, while it provides the most feasible security 
services. 
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